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Pages
- Title
- Replacement as a Problem for Justification of Preventative Detention
- Creator
- Davis, Michael
- Date
- 2011, 2011-04
- Publisher
- John Jay College of Criminal Justice of The City University of New Yor
- Description
-
What makes Don E. Scheid’s article on indefinite detention interesting is that he thinks through many of the moral issues inherent in...
Show moreWhat makes Don E. Scheid’s article on indefinite detention interesting is that he thinks through many of the moral issues inherent in attempting to prevent (or, rather, keep to a minimum) certain kinds of violent crime, an attempt we have come to call (however unwisely) ‘‘the war on terror.’’ Scheid takes ‘‘war’’ as literally as possible, while making the reasonable assumption that this war, unlike wars generally, is not a temporary expedient responding to a moral emergency but an institution that must operate at full power for a long time, decades at least. Scheid’s argument yields a long list of preconditions for justified indefinite preventive detention: a high standard of dangerousness (‘‘mega-terrorism’’), a reasonable standard of proof of dangerousness, as good an investigation as conditions will allow, adequate resources for the defense, a hearing before a fair and independent tribunal, detention under the most comfortable conditions practical, and periodic review of the detainee’s supposed dangerousness. To these preconditions one more should be added: that detaining the persons in question will reduce the danger posed. I take this additional precondition to follow from Scheid’s own defense of indefinite detention, not from an independent argument. Scheid limits his argument to megaterrorists because the scale of destruction they have already achieved (for example, destruction of the World Trade Center) shows them to be dangerous on a scale ordinary crime is not and so to invite measures of prevention beyond what seems necessary (or proper) for ordinary criminals. Scheid explicitly declines to consider the non-consequentialist argument that preventive detention is what a mega-terrorist deserves for his character or for what he has already done. Scheid’s argument for preventive detention is consequentialist throughout: we may, and should, detain to prevent (or at least substantially reduce the probability of) the large-scale destruction of life that mega-terrorists aim at. We may justifiably deny a few, including some innocent persons, their freedom because, and only because, it makes the rest of us, the great majority, considerably safer. My additional precondition can be defended in the same way: where there is no danger posed, any detention is (all else equal) a net loss in happiness, well being, or whatever reasonable measure of consequences we adopt. A precondition of preventative detention must be a net reduction in danger posed. Where what is proposed is an institution of preventative detention, the institution must have that effect overall. What I shall argue here is that preventive detention generally fails to satisfy this condition and Scheid’s indefinite preventive detention of mega-terrorists always does. An institution to prevent terrorism by detaining terrorists cannot, in practice, significantly reduce the danger terrorism poses.
Criminal Justice Ethics. Vol. 30, No. 1, April 2011, 90-97.
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- Title
- University Research and the Wages of Commerce.
- Creator
- Davis, Michael
- Date
- 2006, 1991
- Publisher
- Notre Dame Law School
- Description
-
This is a response to a talk given by Ralph Nader on "The Relationship Between the University and Business and Industry." The author...
Show moreThis is a response to a talk given by Ralph Nader on "The Relationship Between the University and Business and Industry." The author acknowledges that a problems do come up when universities have close ties with industry. However, the author explores the reality of these partnerships through some examples of his own experience at the Illinois Institute of Technology.
Journal of College and University Law, Vol. 19, No. 2, 1991. pp. 29-38.
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- Title
- The Usefulness of Moral Theory in Practical Ethics: A Question of Comparative Cost (A Response to Harris)
- Creator
- Davis, Michael
- Date
- 2009, 2009
- Publisher
- Philosophy Documentation Center
- Description
-
I find myself agreeing with almost everything in Harris’s defense of moral theory except the end: moral theories can often be useful in...
Show moreI find myself agreeing with almost everything in Harris’s defense of moral theory except the end: moral theories can often be useful in resolving moral dilemmas. Both students and practitioners of practical ethics should be constantly reminded of this, because in practical ethics we need all of the help we can get. If (as it seems) these two sentences state the conclusion, Harris has committed a non sequitur. While making a good argument for the general usefulness of moral theory in practical ethics, he has not made any argument for its usefulness to students or practitioners as such. He has simply assumed that what is true of some who engage in practical ethics is true of students and practitioners in particular. In theory, of course, moral theory should be useful even to students and practitioners, helping them to identify issues they might have overlooked, to seek information they might otherwise not have thought relevant, and to formulate courses of action that might not otherwise have occurred to them. In practice, however, moral theory will seldom, if ever, be useful (or, at least, useful enough). We do not (as Harris claims) need all the help we can get in practical ethics. What we need is all the help we can get at reasonable cost. We should only invest the time and effort needed to learn and use moral theory when the investment is no greater than for an otherwise equally useful alternative. Since there is at least one equally useful alternative requiring much less investment, the time and effort students and practitioners would have to invest in moral theory will (in general) be much greater than necessary for their purposes. So, neither students nor practitioners need moral theory.
Teaching Ethics Vol. 10, Issue 1, pp. 69-78
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- Title
- Doing the Minimum as an Alternative to Exercising Reasonable Care in a Professional Role
- Creator
- Davis, Michael
- Date
- 2008, 2000
- Description
-
In the second edition of ENGINEERING ETHICS:CASES AND CONCEPTS (Wadsworth, 2000), Harris, Pritchard, and Rabins distinguish three conceptions...
Show moreIn the second edition of ENGINEERING ETHICS:CASES AND CONCEPTS (Wadsworth, 2000), Harris, Pritchard, and Rabins distinguish three conceptions of professional responsibility: the "minimalist," the "reasonable care" and the "good works". Of the minimalist conception, they say (among other things) that it "holds that engineers have a duty to conform to the standard operating procedures of their profession and to fulfill the basic duties of their job defied by the terms of their employment." (p.101). In contrast, the reasonable care conception "moves beyond the minimalist view's concern to 'stay out of trouble'. (p.103) I will argue that this distinction is incoherent, that the "minimalist conception" (so defined) necessarily includes not only reasonable care but at least some of what Harris, Pritchard, and Rabins classify as "good works". I conclude with a suggestion for what they might say instead about a certain "minimalist attitude" one finds in business (though it truth, it should be called "sub-minimalist".
Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Association for Professional and Practical Ethics (A.P.P.E.), Washington, DC, February 26, 2000.
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- Title
- Professionalism Means Putting Your Profession First
- Creator
- Davis, Michael
- Date
- 2007, 1988
- Publisher
- Georgetown School of Law
- Description
-
Ask a lawyer what "professionalism" means and you are likely to hear that professionalism means putting your client first or acting as an...
Show moreAsk a lawyer what "professionalism" means and you are likely to hear that professionalism means putting your client first or acting as an officer of the court. Only rarely will a lawyer say that professionalism means putting justice first. Never, I think, will a lawyer even suggest that professionalism means putting your profession first. Yet this is the thesis of this paper. The paper has three parts. Section I makes certain distinctions necessary to prevent misunderstanding my thesis. Section II and III develop the thesis into a conception of professionalism. Sections IV and V use that conception to help with the most difficult of undertakings, justifying professional discipline to someone convicted of professional misconduct which harmed neither her client nor an identifiable third party.
Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics. Vol. 2, Issue 1. Summer 1988. pp.341-357.
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- Title
- Some Paradoxes of Whistleblowing
- Creator
- Davis, Michael
- Date
- 2006, 1996
- Publisher
- Philosophy Documentation Center
- Description
-
By "paradox" I mean an apparent- and in this case, real-inconsistency between theory (our systematic understanding of whistleblowing) and the...
Show moreBy "paradox" I mean an apparent- and in this case, real-inconsistency between theory (our systematic understanding of whistleblowing) and the facts (what we actually know, or think we know, about whistleblowing). What concerns me is not a few anomalies, the exceptions that test a rule, but a flood of exceptions that seem to swamp the rule. This paper has four parts. The first states the standard theory of whistleblowing. The second argues that the standard theory is paradoxical, that it is inconsistent with what we know about whistleblowers. The third part sketches what seems to me a less paradoxical theory of whistleblowing. The fourth tests this new theory against one classic case of whistleblowing, Roger Boisjoly's testimony before the presidential commission investigating the Challenger disaster (the "Rogers Commission"). I use that case because the chief facts are both uncontroversial enough and well-known enough to make detailed exposition unnecessary. For the same reasons, I also use that case to illustrate various claims about whistleblowing throughout the paper.
Business and Professional Ethics Journal, Vo. 15, No.1. pp.3-19.
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