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Reflections on the History of Engineering in the United States : A Preface to Engineering Ethics
Title
Reflections on the History of Engineering in the United States : A Preface to Engineering Ethics
Creator
Davis, Michael
Date
2005, 1992-11-19
Publisher
Center for the Study of Ethics in the Professions, IIT
Description
This paper traces the history of the profession of engineering in the United States as a way to gain a better understanding of the field of...
Show moreThis paper traces the history of the profession of engineering in the United States as a way to gain a better understanding of the field of engineering and of engineering ethics.
Lecture at the Center for Academic Ethics and College of Engineering, Wayne State University. Detroit, Michigan. 19 November 1992
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The Moral Legislature
Title
The Moral Legislature
Creator
Davis, Michael
Date
2006, 1985-11-05
Publisher
Center for the Study of Ethics in the Professions, IIT
Description
This paper is an experiment in what John Rawls recently called "Kantian constructiivism". It seeks to establish a "suitable connection between...
Show moreThis paper is an experiment in what John Rawls recently called "Kantian constructiivism". It seeks to establish a "suitable connection between a particular conception of the person and first principles of [morality] by means of a procedure of construction. Yet, it differs from Rawls' similar efforts in a number of ways. The emphasis is morality generally, not justice in particular. The construction attempts to be more "realistic" especially in substituting external procedures for Rawls' "veil of ignorance". These differences are, I hope, at least suggested by substituting "the moral legislature" for Rawls' "original position". Section I of this paper explains further what motivates the sort of construction proposed, sections II-V describe the moral legislature itself, explaining as well why it makes sense to construct it as I do and how it differs from some obvious alternatives. Section VI concludes with an example of how the moral legislature might be used, the sketch of an argument for the claim that positive law cannot in in generally be morally obliging.
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Methodological Missteps: A Response to Brooks' "On Retribution"
Title
Methodological Missteps: A Response to Brooks' "On Retribution"
Creator
Davis, Michael
Date
2006, 2006-05-14
Publisher
Center for the Study of Ethics in the Professions, IIT
Description
Thom Brooks claims his paper has only one thesis—that, for epistemological reasons (in particular, requiring a “gold standard of desert”), ...
Show moreThom Brooks claims his paper has only one thesis—that, for epistemological reasons (in particular, requiring a “gold standard of desert”), “retributivism is impossible to enact as a practice”. I think the paper has at least two other theses as well, both unacknowledged and more or less independent of the first. One is that there is only one true retributivism (“pure retributivism” or “retributivism strictly speaking”). This claim seems to rest on an unjustified, and (I believe) unjustifiable, Platonism. The second unacknowledged thesis is that this one true retributivism suffers (and must suffer) from certain flaws, in particular: 1) moral rigorism (forbidding the criminal justice system to show mercy or to deviate in any other way from what the criminal deserves for his crime); 2) methodological individualism (requiring that desert be “a particular criminal’s desert” unaffected by “other factors, such as society’s equilibrium”); and 3) methodological absolutism (an inability to “choose punishments on account of how they might be related to each other and various crimes”). What I propose to do here is, first, briefly dispose of Brooks’ epistemological claim, then (at greater length) explain why retributivism is best thought of as a family of loosely related theories no one of which has the privilege of being “true retributivism” (even though some are certainly historically or conceptually closer to the core of retributive thinking than others) and, last, why, so understood, retributivism does not suffer from any of the three flaws Brooks claims true retributivism must suffer from.
Published as part of the Online Philosophy Conference, May 14, 2006.http://experimentalphilosophy.typepad.com/online_philosophy_confere/
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Do the Professional Ethics of Chemists and Engineers Differ ?
Title
Do the Professional Ethics of Chemists and Engineers Differ ?
Creator
Davis, Michael
Date
2011, 2002
Publisher
HYLE - International Journal for Philosophy of Chemistry
Description
This paper provides a sketch of my general way of understanding professions and then applies that sketch to a specific question, how to...
Show moreThis paper provides a sketch of my general way of understanding professions and then applies that sketch to a specific question, how to distinguish between two very similar professions, chemistry and engineering. I argue that the professional ethics of chemists do differ from the professional ethics of engineers and that the differences are important. The argument requires definition of both ‘ethics’ and ‘profession’ – as well delving into the details of chemistry and engineering.
HYLE – International Journal for Philosophy of Chemistry Vol. 8, No . 1 (2002) http://www.hyle.org/journal/issues/8-1/davis.htm
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The Usefulness of Moral Theory in Practical Ethics: A Question of Comparative Cost (A Response to Harris)
Title
The Usefulness of Moral Theory in Practical Ethics: A Question of Comparative Cost (A Response to Harris)
Creator
Davis, Michael
Date
2009, 2009
Publisher
Philosophy Documentation Center
Description
I find myself agreeing with almost everything in Harris’s defense of moral theory except the end: moral theories can often be useful in...
Show moreI find myself agreeing with almost everything in Harris’s defense of moral theory except the end: moral theories can often be useful in resolving moral dilemmas. Both students and practitioners of practical ethics should be constantly reminded of this, because in practical ethics we need all of the help we can get. If (as it seems) these two sentences state the conclusion, Harris has committed a non sequitur. While making a good argument for the general usefulness of moral theory in practical ethics, he has not made any argument for its usefulness to students or practitioners as such. He has simply assumed that what is true of some who engage in practical ethics is true of students and practitioners in particular. In theory, of course, moral theory should be useful even to students and practitioners, helping them to identify issues they might have overlooked, to seek information they might otherwise not have thought relevant, and to formulate courses of action that might not otherwise have occurred to them. In practice, however, moral theory will seldom, if ever, be useful (or, at least, useful enough). We do not (as Harris claims) need all the help we can get in practical ethics. What we need is all the help we can get at reasonable cost. We should only invest the time and effort needed to learn and use moral theory when the investment is no greater than for an otherwise equally useful alternative. Since there is at least one equally useful alternative requiring much less investment, the time and effort students and practitioners would have to invest in moral theory will (in general) be much greater than necessary for their purposes. So, neither students nor practitioners need moral theory.
Teaching Ethics Vol. 10, Issue 1, pp. 69-78
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