DETECTING GNSS SPOOFING ATTACKS USING INS COUPLING
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Vulnerability of Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) users to signal spoofing is a critical threat to positioning integrity, especially in aviation applications, where the consequences are potentially catastrophic. In response, this research describes and evaluates a new approach to directly detect spoofing using integrated Inertial Navigation Systems (INS) and fault detection concepts based on integrity monitoring. The monitors developed here can be implemented into positioning systems using INS/GNSS integration via 1) tightly-coupled, 2) loosely-coupled, and 3) uncoupled schemes. New evaluation methods enable the statistical computation of integrity risk resulting from a worst-case spoofing attack – without needing to simulate an unmanageably large number of individual aircraft approaches. Integrity risk is an absolute measure of safety and a well-established metric in aircraft navigation. A novel closed-form solution to the worst-case time sequence of GNSS signals is derived to maximize the integrity risk for each monitor and used in the covariance analyses. This methodology tests the performance of the monitors against the most sophisticated spoofers, capable of tracking the aircraft position – for example, by means of remote tracking or onboard sensing. Another contribution is a comprehensive closed-loop model that encapsulates the vehicle and compensator (estimator and controller) dynamics. A sensitivity analysis uses this model to quantify the leveraging impact of the vehicle’s dynamic responses (e.g., to wind gusts, or to autopilot’s acceleration commands) on the monitor’s detection capability. The performance of the monitors is evaluated for two safety-critical terminal area navigation applications: 1) autonomous shipboard landing and 2) Boeing 747 (B747) landing assisted with Ground Based Augmentation Systems (GBAS). It is demonstrated that for both systems, the monitors are capable of meeting the most stringent precision approach and landing integrity requirements of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). The statistical evaluation methods developed here can be used as a baseline procedure in the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) certification of spoof-free navigation systems. The final contribution is an investigation of INS sensor quality on detection performance. This determines the minimum sensor requirements to perform standalone GNSS positioning in general en route applications with guaranteed spoofing detection integrity.